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Economic Education and Government 
Reform in the Republic of Georgia 
Craig R. MacPhee 
Abstract: The author describes public education through the media and training 
for government officials and for journalists undertaken as part of economic 
reform efforts in the Republic of Georgia of the former Soviet Union. The arti- 
cle concludes with a discussion of the necessary conditions for success of these 
broad-based educational efforts. 
Key words: education, Georgia, reform, teaching, transition 
JEL codes: A29, P30 
The economies of the Soviet Union were sick before the demise of Communism 
and took a turn for the worse after the USSR split into 15 separate republics. The 
patients fell into depression accompanied by greater unemployment, inflation, 
poverty and their complementary social ills. Western advisors prescribed PILLS: 
privatization, investment, liberalization, legislation (to establish the rule of law), 
and stabilization. There is controversy, however, over the dosage, which was 
recently summarized by Stiglitz (1999). Shock therapy requires large doses of 
PILLS over a short time, and gradualism involves low doses over an extended peri- 
od. Nevertheless, Western economists generally would agree that PILLS are nec- 
essary for the restoration of economic growth and future prosperity. 
Unfortunately, the patients do not share the Western doctors' confidence in 
PILLS. Communist propaganda transmitted through the media and schools glo- 
rified the productivity of Soviet workers and factories, the security of life isolat- 
ed from the West, and the "free" government services including electricity and 
health care. At the same time, the propagandists criticized capitalism for its high 
crime rates, monopolistic exploitation, and macroeconomic instability. The pro- 
paganda was repeated so often that it took on the status of truth. Contradictions, 
such as high Western living standards could always be attributed to capitalistic 
imperialism. Even if the average Soviet citizen did not believe all the propagan- 
da, survival in a Marxist totalitarian regime required adoption of a Soviet mind- 
set. Laws were unnecessary; just follow the orders of those in authority, and if 
one wanted to benefit from the orders, then do the bosses a favor. Do not make a 
decision; leave it to the higher authorities. Avoid making recommendations, giv- 
ing specific answers, and taking responsibility; these actions could lead to 
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Siberia or worse. Better to do nothing, to act like everyone else, and to speak with 
vagueness and ambiguity. There were no private property rights, so you helped 
yourself to public property. Successful party officials advanced with big new 
construction projects; never mind the operation, maintenance, and repair of the 
existing capital stock. 
Because production goals were usually quantitative, no one bothered about 
quality. Because prices were set, there was no interest in monetary policy. 
Because virtually all inputs and outputs were allocated by the government, there 
were no concerns about taxes, expenditures, and fiscal deficits. Because external 
trade was mostly prohibited, there were no worries about trade deficits or tariff 
revenue. Because every important decision was made in Moscow, government 
officials in the republics were unconcerned with policymaking. And the public 
was cynical about the behavior of government officials. Because the republics 
resented Moscow, the local government officials and state enterprise managers 
were more intent on limitation of exports to other republics than on fulfillment 
of Moscow's five-year plans. 
These attitudes make PILLS alone inadequate for reform in the former Soviet 
Union, because, as Fischer (1999) has noted, successful transition requires a 
broad consensus supporting implementation of reforms. These attitudes can be 
changed through education, but they also make educational efforts difficult. 
Reformers have been slow to appreciate the role of education in transitional 
economies, but broad-based efforts have been organized with increased frequen- 
cy in recent years. Visiting professors in universities, Muskie fellowships for stu- 
dents, and exchange programs between Western and Eastern institutions have 
been funded for many years. Advising government officials also involves educa- 
tional efforts in seminars and tutorials. The new emphasis is on public education 
through the media: training for journalists, coordinated press conferences and 
interviews, publication of reports and information (GEPLAC 1998), call-in radio 
programs, and advertising on television. I provide some illustrations of these 
educational efforts and conclude with a discussion of the necessary conditions 
for their effectiveness. The illustrations are presented in the context of some hard 
lessons taught by recent economic events in Georgia. 
EDUCATIONAL EFFORTS 
Lesson 1: Open Economies Are Subject to External Shocks 
After independence, Georgia was cut off from rubles previously supplied by 
the Russian central bank. In 1993, the government of Georgia ignored warnings 
from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) (International 
Monetary Fund 1995-98) and began printing currency coupons so fast that prices 
rose by 7,488 percent in 1993 and by another 6,474 percent in 1994. After the 
introduction of a new currency, the lari, in 1997, however, responsible monetary 
policy eventually eliminated inflation and preserved a stable dollar/lari exchange 
rate of 0.75 in early 1998. 
Public confidence in the lari was shattered by the Russian financial crisis of 
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August 1998. The lari plummeted to $0.50 during the first weekend in Septem- 
ber, and Georgian newspapers were soon full of stories variously blaming the 
devaluation on Georgia's dependence on trade with Russia, on the incompetence 
of Georgian government officials, on unscrupulous foreign exchange retailers, 
and on manipulation by a banking oligopoly. The Georgian media reflected Sovi- 
et attitudes against international trade, against pro-market reformers in govern- 
ment, and against exploitation by financial capitalists. 
The National Bank of Georgia (NBG) quickly raised interest rates on inter- 
bank credit (the equivalent of our federal funds rate) from 22 percent to 38 per- 
cent, intervened in the small foreign exchange market by selling $15 million, and 
announced its intentions to stabilize the exchange rate on television. The lari rose 
back to $0.74 within days, but media coverage of this episode demonstrated the 
need for more widespread and reliable economic education in Georgia. 
The Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS) center in Georgia 
responded with a report examining the economic links between Russia and Geor- 
gia (MacPhee 1998a). This report pointed out that Russia accounted for only 
one-fourth of Georgian exports and that these amounted to only 1 percent of 
Georgia's gross domestic product (GDP), hardly a vehicle to wreak havoc on the 
Georgian economy. Georgian imports from Russia were mainly natural gas, elec- 
tricity, grains, and machinery, items with price elasticities low enough to lower 
Georgia's import spending in the aftermath of the ruble devaluation. The main 
difficulty created by the Russian crisis was one that had not been mentioned in 
the press. At least 200,000 Georgians (one-tenth of those employed) earned 
income in other parts of the former Soviet Union and made remittances home of 
income equivalent to 5 percent of Georgia's GDP. The Russian recession would 
lower those remittances. The decline in demand for the lari, therefore, could be 
explained by expectations of recession in Georgia rather than by evil doings in 
the foreign exchange markets. 
Nevertheless, the NBG used the crisis as an excuse to shut down 343 of the 
465 currency exchange booths that operated in Tbilisi, the capital city that hous- 
es almost one-third of the Georgian population. The NBG's move would obvi- 
ously increase the market power of the remaining booths, which were associated 
with a few dominant banks. This anti-competitive action, however, was opposed 
by donor countries and international financial organizations and most of the 
exchange booths were allowed to re-open. Lobbyists continued to press the gov- 
ernment for stricter licensing regulations, requiring bullet proof glass, and so 
forth, that would drive up the costs of operating small booths and thus drive them 
out of business. 
Lesson 2: Automatic Adjustment Mechanisms Work 
Between its introduction in 1995 and September 1998, the lari had only depre- 
ciated 9 percent against the dollar, but this was a result of the IMF's willingness 
to finance relatively small balance of payments deficits. The NBG had spent 
$172 million defending the lari in 1997, but it had not had to intervene at all in 
1998 until the September 1998 crisis. By the end of October 1998, the lari fell 
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briefly to $0.67, the NBG had only $100 million left in reserves, and the IMF was 
threatening to cut off the stabilization funds because the Georgian government 
had not collected as much tax revenue as it had agreed to do. This situation pro- 
voked wild commentary from government officials and from the media that the 
lari would go into free fall, and the Georgian economy would collapse. Again, 
the old Soviet ignorance of equilibrating mechanisms in markets was manifest. 
The IRIS center in Tbilisi responded with another report that examined the var- 
ious components of Georgia's international payments and calculated that the bal- 
ance of payments deficit was doubling in size (MacPhee 1998b). A simple elas- 
ticities approach was used to estimate that the dollar value of the lari would fall 40 
percent if no stabilization funds were received from external sources. This would 
be a substantial devaluation, but the report noted that it was not out of line with the 
recent experience of other transitional economies, and 40 percent was hardly a free 
fall. The report did not eliminate sensationalism in the media, but the lari did fall 
about 40 percent, and since then, it has fluctuated around that low level. 
Lesson 3: Instability Hinders Growth 
The report on the devaluation of the lari also explained the effects of the deval- 
uation on inflation, on the burden of Georgia's large foreign debt, and, perhaps 
most important, on Georgia's fledgling financial sector. In the absence of stock 
and bond markets, banks were the main source of funding for local business 
investment. After independence, many defunct state enterprises formed bank 
subsidiaries, and as many as 229 banks in 1995 existed with less combined cap- 
ital than one mid-sized American bank. Most of these so-called banks had made 
loans to insiders who promptly fled with the money, so their assets were often 
worthless. Moreover, the government had frozen deposits during the hyperinfla- 
tion of 1994, certainly not a policy to inspire confidence in potential depositors. 
Consequently, Georgians kept their monetary wealth in dollars hidden under 
floorboards, and the banks were largely unable to perform their role of financial 
intermediation. Bankruptcy and consolidation, encouraged by NBG enforcement 
of minimum capital requirements and other regulations, reduced the number of 
banks to 47 by 1998. Only 22 were considered to be viable and they accounted 
for almost all the deposits and current lending in Georgia. 
The concentration in banking made this sector a natural target for the media 
and the politicians who decried the low interest rates on deposits (averaging 
about 14 percent during the first half of 1998), the high interest rates on loans 
(about 37 percent), and the supposed manipulation of the exchange rates. The 
devaluation report (MacPhee 1998b) attempted to explain that devaluation actu- 
ally weakened the banks even more. They were required to hold lari reserves that 
lost relative value and nervous depositors were making withdrawals. Thus, the 
abysmally low level of bank lending would fall even lower in an economy that 
desperately needed more investment. 
Risk and inflationary expectations were keeping loan interest rates high and 
also explained the large spread between deposit and loan rates. The links among 
the exchange rate, inflationary expectations, and the government's failure to col- 
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lect taxes also needed emphasis. In the absence of a bond market and IMF funds, 
the NBG would be under pressure to monetize the deficit, actions that the pub- 
lic remembered as leading to the hyperinflation of 1994. Inflationary expecta- 
tions increased the demand for dollars and kept downward pressure on the value 
of the lari. 
These principles of economics were presented to about 40 journalists who 
attended a three-day workshop sponsored by the World Bank in December, 1998 
(MacPhee 1998c). The workshop also covered trade liberalization and the impli- 
cations of WTO accession for Georgia, privatization in the energy sector, private 
lending activities of the International Finance Corporation and of subsidized 
Western banks, as well as sessions devoted to journalism issues. 
The discussion of media issues turned out to be revealing as conflicts surfaced 
between the new private, and mostly young, journalists and the old state-run 
broadcasters and publishers. After the middle-aged producer of a state radio news 
series described some of her public information programs on reforms, she was 
derided by the youths. The young journalists criticized her hypocrisy as a former 
communist, the tedium of her program (which the youths claimed had low rat- 
ings), and her biased reporting on reforms, reforms that the cynical youths 
regarded as ineffectual. This criticism of the slow reforms presented an opportu- 
nity for discussion of the economic concepts of long-run growth and short-run 
instability with emphasis on the centuries it took for the market system in West- 
ern Europe to develop. Nevertheless, the seminar did not succeed in dispelling 
the cynicism of the young journalists. 
Lesson 4: Deficit Monetization Leads to Currency Depreciation 
The need for journalists to learn about the harmful effects of fiscal deficits was 
evident. The World Bank sponsored a second three-day workshop, the European 
Union sponsored a semester-long course in Tbilisi; the Academy for Educational 
Development with USAID funds sent eight journalists to California State Univer- 
sity at Chico for courses including macroeconomics and microeconomics, and the 
USAID-funded Barents Group Fiscal Reform Project held weekly seminars dur- 
ing spring 1999. Economic advisors also offered a three-week course on macro- 
economics to 35 future government officials in the masters program of the new 
Georgia Institute of Public Administration, a program funded by the United States. 
Reporting on the importance of fiscal reform improved and the media ex- 
pressed more skepticism toward government officials who blamed their failure to 
collect more tax revenue on the bad weather and the Russian crisis. A public opin- 
ion survey indicated that the public was getting the message. About 92 percent be- 
lieved that corruption was an impediment to collecting taxes and 82 percent said 
that they would pay their taxes if everyone else did. Seventy-two percent felt that 
tax rates were too high, however, and most thought that revenues were going to 
pensioners and the police rather than to their high priorities: education and health 
care. Despite the increased public awareness of the causes and consequences of 
deficits, the rate of tax collections actually fell in late 1998. 
On December 4, 1998, the NBG gave up its defense of the lari and, as noted 
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previously, its value fell about 40 percent. This unleashed a torrent of wild state- 
ments in the media, reflecting either economic ignorance or demagoguery. The 
press reported immediate price increases of 60 percent, stirring up fears of a 
resumption of runaway inflation. The volatility of the lari's exchange value, 
which bobbed up and down between $0.47 and $0.63 a dozen times in the first 
two months of floating, also contributed to uncertainty. Of course, the press was 
full of stories blaming the ups and downs on conspiracies among banks, 
exchange dealers, and corrupt government officials. A jump in kerosene prices 
was attributed to a cartel controlled by Nugzar Shevardnadze, the president's 
nephew, instead of the onset of cold weather and a decrease in electricity supply. 
The time was right for more exercises in public education. In December 1998, 
U.S. advisors went on a radio call-in show, and in February 1999, the IRIS cen- 
ter issued another report explaining the reasons for volatility and the links 
between inflation, devaluation, and the fiscal deficit (MacPhee 1999a). One did 
not need conspiracies to explain volatility. The exchange market for the lari was 
very thin, and it was driven by expectations that changed with each bit of bad or 
good news from Russia or the IMF. People held more dollars than lari, but they 
would change into lari for transactions such as holiday shopping, thereby caus- 
ing temporary appreciation. Monetary policy had tightened after the September 
crisis, but government spending financed by the National Bank led to a 22 per- 
cent increase in the lari money supply in December 1998. The report concluded 
that "Nothing would bolster the lari like a big increase in tax collections." 
Both the February report and a subsequent IRIS study (MacPhee 1999b) dis- 
puted the runaway inflation claims. The IRIS staff carried out an independent sur- 
vey of the most important items in the Georgian consumer price index (CPI) and 
found that the CPI was fairly accurate. In the first two months after the devalua- 
tion, the CPI rose only 15 percent. The reports of 60 percent inflation were bogus. 
Lesson 5: Taxes Plus Collections Equals Revenue 
Shortly after issuance of the February report, the United States announced a 
narrower emphasis for technical assistance efforts with concentration on just a 
few areas, the most important one perhaps being tax collections. The American 
ambassador visited with the Georgian president to gain his assurance of cooper- 
ation, and the fiscal reform project began a much more aggressive program. Most 
of the fiscal reform activities involved retraining tax inspectors, reorganizing the 
tax department, and overseeing the implementation of new policies such as 
excise tax stamps. 
The IMF had long insisted on increases in tax collections. Higher revenue was 
favored by USAID, the Georgian parliament, and the Georgian president. The 
Ministry of Finance in prior years had issued budgets based on optimistic pro- 
jections of tax revenue, in part to set high goals for the independent tax depart- 
ment. But there had never been any systematic effort to estimate the size of the 
tax bases that should be the foundation of serious projections. The responsible 
government officials needed to be educated on the methods that economists 
would use to estimate the size of the tax bases. 
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Advisors from the U.S. Treasury, the IMF, and the USAID-funded Barents 
Group Fiscal Reform Project met with officials of the State Department of Sta- 
tistics, the Macroeconomic Forecasting Department of the Ministry of Finance, 
the Parliament Budget Office, members of the Parliament Budget Committee, 
and the Ministry of Economy. The main problem facing estimation of potential 
tax revenue turned out to be the lack of reliable statistics on the economy. The 
Department of Statistics and most ministries were full of Soviet-era appa- 
ratchiks even though the leaders were young, sometimes with American train- 
ing in economics. The apparatchiks were used to sitting back and receiving 
often-erroneous and usually unaudited reports from state enterprises, which 
they would then aggregate in order to issue their quarterly statistical review for 
the republic. 
The Statistics Department staff were not doing what one normally thinks of as 
economic statistics. They had little awareness of sampling techniques or statisti- 
cal inference. When advisors demonstrated to them how the travel component of 
the current account could be estimated with a short telephone survey of 20 active 
hotels in Tbilisi (MacPhee 1998d), the staff responded with a 10-page question- 
naire for 1,000 (mostly defunct) hotels in Georgia and a proposal for a law 
requiring the hotels to file the report monthly. At this point, the advisors gave 
them a short lesson on cost-benefit analysis that unfortunately did not halt the 
bureaucratic momentum behind the comprehensive questionnaire. 
Despite years of intermittent training by IMF and European advisors, the 
national income accounts and trade statistics were still unreliable. The World 
Bank, however, had installed some former statistics professors in the Depart- 
ment of Statistics in order to do a fairly reliable household survey. Thus, some 
reasonably accurate information on consumption could be pieced together with 
some of the more reliable production data using the international trade identi- 
ty: consumption = production - exports + imports. Fiscal advisors demonstrat- 
ed to the Georgians the ways in which they could estimate the tax bases for cus- 
toms duties and excises on cigarettes, gasoline, and alcohol, as well as the 
value-added tax (MacPhee 1999c-h). Eventually, they agreed to form an inter- 
agency working group that would employ these methods on a regular basis to 
introduce more realism into the Georgian budget. Most of the estimates were 
astounding. The foregone revenue from cigarettes alone would have covered 40 
percent of the total government budget deficit. The tax collection rate on petro- 
leum products was only 44 percent, and collection of VAT was only 48 percent 
of potential. 
Fiscal advisors also worked with the Ministries of Finance and Economy on 
the subject of forecasting revenues (MacPhee 1999i,j). Here the previous educa- 
tional efforts of a series of short-term advisors from the U.S. Treasury, the IMF, 
and the World Bank had gone astray. Forecasting seminars had been offered to 
the staff, and computer hardware and software had been provided. Afterward, the 
staff spent their time constructing models using data from unreliable time series, 
none longer than four years. Then they would issue their wildly over-optimistic 
forecasts without disclosing anything about the model. 
With sensitivity to the emotional investment some of the Georgian staff had in 
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their forecasting work, the fiscal advisors took a very low-key approach. U.S.- 
trained Georgian advisors worked with the forecasting staff to document their 
model, to review the unreliable data and, in the process, to suggest improve- 
ments. The advisors also explained the importance of careful interpretation of 
forecasts in light of their inevitable inaccuracies. The staff of the Ministry of 
Finance seemed to react favorably to this approach, but it will not be until future 
budgets are formulated that we will be able to assess the outcome. 
Lesson 6: Economic Principles Appear on Television 
To encourage the compliance of taxpayers and the re-election of reformers, 
the USAID funded an extensive public education campaign with a series of 
television messages in the summer of 1999. The television messages were 
scripted and produced by Georgians and, like commercial messages, they were 
short and superficial. Nevertheless, each of the messages reflected a principle 
of economics, although not all were principles that are commonly emphasize in 
American classrooms. 
Here are the lessons that the television messages attempted to communicate: 
People need to make choices. People need to be adaptable because economic 
growth requires change, a point illustrated visually by a steam locomotive being 
transformed into a bullet train and by a VW Beetle being transformed into a race- 
car. Growth will benefit future generations, a message reinforced by a scene of 
the Pilgrim ships giving way to the lunar landing. The American market system 
is worthy of emulation, demonstrated by scenes of the Manhattan skyline. Peo- 
ple need to cooperate and work together in the new system in order to accom- 
plish their goals, illustrated by armies of workers building the pyramids in Egypt 
and by two cartoon spacemen working cooperatively on an alien planet. Reform 
is a long process but it has a lot of momentum and there is no going backward, 
symbolized once again by the locomotive transformed into bullet train. World 
markets are competitive and competitors have to move fast, again demonstrated 
by the transformed VW racing around a speedway. The main purpose of taxation 
is to finance public goods, a message backed up with pictures of Georgia's nat- 
ural scenery and wildlife, historical monuments, roadways, and school children. 
Tax evasion hurts all of us by denying public goods to ourselves. The obvious 
free rider problem was ignored until the last message about penalties for failure 
to pay taxes, illustrated by a scene of tax inspectors confiscating cases of 
unstamped cigarettes and alcohol. 
These were basic messages, some might even say platitudes, but public opin- 
ion surveys had revealed widespread public ignorance about the reform process. 
The television messages addressed the fundamental ideas that markets are a form 
of cooperation and that government has a legitimate role in a market economy. 
Whether the messages accomplished their goal, however, is an open question. 
The pro-reform coalition in parliament managed to maintain its majority in elec- 
tions at the end of October 1999, and excise tax collections rose in the late sum- 
mer and early fall of 1999. However, tax collections again fell in late 1999 and 
the IMF again began withholding stabilization funds. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Although this article is confined to broad-based educational efforts in only one 
of the 15 republics of the former Soviet Union, a similar need for economic edu- 
cation exists in most other transition economies. After a decade of reform, there 
is still widespread belief in the outmoded Soviet ideas of isolationism, govern- 
ment control, capitalistic exploitation and instability. These ideas impede the 
process of reform by providing a rationale for government policies that are inef- 
ficient, fiscally and monetarily irresponsible, anticompetitive, and inflationary. 
These ideas also foster corruption among poorly paid government officials and 
cynicism among the citizens. 
The technical assistance community has gradually become aware of the barri- 
ers to reform erected by the old ways of thinking. This awareness has motivated 
the recent emphasis on education through advising government officials, training 
journalists, and providing accurate information to the general public. These edu- 
cational efforts have faced their own share of difficulties: mistakes in translation, 
lack of continuity, overly sophisticated concepts, and poor coordination among 
the various agencies providing technical assistance. 
Economic educators in transition economies need to place more emphasis on 
the very basic ideas of scarcity, choices, short run, long run, and tradeoffs. They 
need to stress the importance of accurate measurement of economic variables. 
They need to give repeated explanations of the sources of change and the equili- 
brating mechanisms in market economies. They need to clarify the roles of com- 
petition, property rights, and stable government policies. Finally, they need to 
remind the local citizens as well as the technical assistance community that the 
reform process is a long one. The evolution of the market system in Western 
Europe did not take place overnight, and one should not have unrealistic expec- 
tations that the present economic reforms will take less than a generation. 
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